The SECURE project is investigating the design of security mechanisms for pervasive computing based on the human notion of trust. Our work addresses how entities that encounter each other in unfamiliar, pervasive computing environments can overcome initial suspicion to allow secure collaboration to take place.
3rd April 2003
The SECURE project is investigating the design of security mechanisms for pervasive computing based on the human notion of trust. Our work addresses how entities that encounter each other in unfamiliar, pervasive computing environments can overcome initial suspicion to allow secure collaboration to take place.
Overview
At present most substantial, accountable computation is carried out by registered parties operating behind firewalls in strictly controlled environments. On the other hand, pervasive computing foresees a massively networked infrastructure supporting a large population of diverse but cooperating entities. Entities will be both autonomous and mobile and will have to be capable of dealing with unforeseen circumstances ranging from unexpected interactions with other entities to disconnected operation. These properties of the pervasive computing infrastructure introduce new security challenges that are not adequately addressed by existing security models and mechanisms. The scale of the pervasive computing infrastructure means that security policy must encompass billions of potential collaborators. Mobile entities are likely to become disconnected from their home network, therefore they require the ability to make fully autonomous security decisions; they cannot rely on a specific security infrastructure such as certificate authorities and authorisation servers. Although certificate authorities may be used to establish the identity of other collaborators reliably, in the environment envisaged identity conveys no a priori information about the likely behavior of the principal. Identity alone therefore cannot be used for access control decisions, i.e. all participants are virtually anonymous. The dynamism of the pervasive computing infrastructure means that entities which offer services will be confronted with requests from entities that they have never met before; mobile entities will need to obtain services within environments that are unfamiliar and possibly hostile. A party faced with such a complex world stands to benefit, but only if it can respond to new entities and assign meaningful privileges to them.
The general goal of our work is therefore to investigate the design of a novel approach to security that addresses the challenges outlined above. If successful, this approach will offer significant benefits not only for future systems but also in the context of a range of emerging applications in the mobile computing arena as well as for collaboration over the existing Internet in situations where both the identities and intentions of correspondents are difficult to establish with certainty.
Our approach is based on the application of the human notion of trust. This leads naturally to a decentralised approach to security management that can tolerate partial information, albeit one in which there is an inherent element of risk for the trusting entity. Fundamentally, it is the ability to reason about trust and risk that allows entities to accept risk when they are interacting with other entities. Hence, the central problem to be addressed by the SECURE project is to provide entities with a basis for reasoning about trust and risk embodied in a computational framework that can be adapted to a variety of application scenarios. Underlying this framework is a formal computational model of trust that will provide the formal basis for reasoning about trust and for the deployment of verifiable security policies.
By way of example, consider the problem of routing messages in an ad hoc wireless network. An entity, i.e. a mobile node, with a message to send must rely on other nodes located on the path to the intended destination to forward its message. In the general case, the intermediate nodes may have no a priori relationship or agreement with the sender, whom they may never have encountered previously. Moreover, forwarding messages has a cost in terms of battery and processing power. Why then should a sender rely on such nodes to act on its behalf? If multiple paths exist, in which path should the sender have most confidence? Fundamentally, these decisions are trusting decisions informed by the degree to which the sender trusts the intermediate nodes to "do the right thing" based on its observation and past experience of the nodes concerned, their reputations, and possibly recommendations from third parties. These decisions are also mediated by the risk being taken. Less trust is probably needed to send a message of low importance, more for a message of higher importance that really needs to arrive!
Understanding trust
Trust is a phenomenon that humans use every day to promote interaction and accept risk in situations where only partial information is available, allowing one person to assume that another will behave as expected. Despite the extensive study of trust in the social sciences, i.e. sociology, psychology and philosophy, it remains an elusive concept, which defies stringent definition. This is due in part to trust being largely invisible and implicit in society. A wide variety of definitions of trust have been put forward [9] , many of which are dependent on the context in which trust is examined, or the viewpoint that the author adopts. It is this multifaceted characteristic of trust which makes it difficult to form a unified definition.
To begin with it is useful to examine dictionary definitions of trust to determine those that are widely accepted. Common to these definitions are the notions of confidence, belief, faith, hope, expectation, dependence and reliance on the integrity, ability, or character of a person or thing. The variety of common terms given here demonstrates the lack of precise definition and hints at the range of different views of trust. As further examples from the literature, Gambetta [5] introduces trust as "a particular level of the subjective probability with which an agent assesses that another agent or a group of agents will perform a particular action, both before he can monitor such action (or independently of his capacity ever to be able to monitor it) and in a context in which it affects his own action". Deutsch's work [3] considers trust when faced with an ambiguous path with beneficial or harmful results dependent on another person. He identifies a wide variety of types of trust, ranging from trust as the fallback when no other option is available to trust as confidence whereby the trustor has confidence that the desired outcome will be reached. Deutsch suggests that trusting actions are taken when the likelihood of being let down is outweighed by the possible benefits, which suggests that risk analysis forms an important part of the decision to trust. Due to these and many other views expressed in the literature, Marsh [8] reasons that it may prove more suitable to attempt to model the behaviour of trust rather than trust itself, removing the need to adhere to specific definitions.
An important observation from all these sources is that trust is a subjective notion, being an individual's opinion of another individual, and thus every individual makes its own decision to trust or not based on the evidence available for personal evaluation (although an individual may be prepared to delegate this decision to a more authoritative source in certain circumstances). Moreover, trust is not symmetric which implies that two individuals do not need to have similar trust in each other. Even if two entities are presented with the same evidence they may not necessarily interpret this information in the same way.
Trust is also situation-specific such that trust in one environment does not directly transfer to another environment and as a result a notion of context is necessary. Despite this situational nature, there is some agreement on a dispositional aspect of trust as a measure of one's propensity to believe in the trustworthiness of others.
The literature also highlights the dynamic properties of trust in that trust is self-preserving and self-amplifying, increasing through periodic successful interactions and degrading through disuse or misuse.
Trust is inherently linked to risk; there is no reason to trust if there is no risk involved. This relationship implies that higher risk means cooperation is less likely to occur, unless the benefits of interaction are worth the risk. Reasoning about trust therefore allows entities to accept risk when they are interacting with others.
The approach taken in the SECURE project is based around the premise that trust and risk are inexorably linked and must both be considered when taking a decision about an ambiguous path, the outcome of which depends on the actions of another entity.
The trust model
Note to the editor: This section could be included as a sidebar to the article.
The aim of the trust model [1] is to provide formal techniques for studying properties of trust based systems. Our formal model focuses on the set T , the set of trust values, whose elements represent degrees of trust. The set T has two orderings and such that (T , ) is a complete lattice and (T , ) is a complete partial order, with a bottom element. The ordering reflects the notion of "more trust" saying that a particular trust value may represent a higher level of trust than another, whereas the ordering reflects information saying that a particular trust value may contain more information than another. In a setting with a huge number of interacting principals it is unreasonable to assume that every principal has precise information, or even any information at all, about every other principal. For instance principals will often have to act on requests from unknown principals. The element ⊥ represents the value unknown. In this setting it is important to distinguish this element from ⊥ , which represents no trust: the former is interpreted as having no evidence for trust or distrust, whereas the latter implies an explicit reason for distrusting the particular principal.
In [1] we give a technique for building the triple (T , , ) starting with a complete lattice, (D, ≤), and considering the set of intervals of
The ordering will be a natural lifting of ≤ to these intervals. The order considers the "width" of intervals, which can be thought of as representing the amount of uncertainty, i.e. the real trust value is somewhere in that interval, but we are not sure exactly where.
A simple example could be starting with the complete lattice of reals ( Now given a set of principals P and the set T we can see trust information as a function:
The function m applied to a, applied to b is the trust value m(a)(b) ∈ T expressing a's trust in b.
Furthermore every principal has a local policy which is its contribution to the global trust information. It expresses how the principal plans to compute trust information. The model can handle the concept of delegation, which in this setting, means that a principal may refer to another principal's trust information. This means that every principal may express its trust in another principal, not just in terms of its own beliefs, but also in terms of the beliefs of other principals. Given a ∈ P, the policy π a can be seen as a function of the following type:
This function takes "the current trust information about all principals" (function m) and returns a function which expresses a's trust in a given principal 1 .
The collection of all local policies induces a global policy function 2 :
As an important general assumption we require that Π is a -continuous function. Intuitively this is a reasonable assumption: it amounts to requiring that all policies should satisfy the fact that "the more information is provided by other principals, the more information is provided by the policy". From this assumption the global trust information is safely defined as the least fixed point of Π.
Handling trusted interactions
The trust needed for an interaction depends on the risk involved. This gives appropriate security in pervasive environments, without calling for excessive trust in straightforward cases. When a system grants privileges to a principal it is with the expectation that they will use them in a particular manner, for example, to update outdated address book entries with accurate information. There is, however, also the possibility that the principal will deviate from this expected behaviour, and the combined likelihood and severity of this is the risk of granting them a privilege.
In SECURE , the risks of a trust-mediated action are decomposed by possible outcomes. The risk of an outcome depends on the trustworthiness of the other principal (the likelihood ), and on the outcome's intrinsic cost. For example, an address update might be out of date itself, or maliciously misleading: the costs of these two outcomes would reflect the user's wasted time, while the likelihoods would depend on trust in the other party.
The costs of an outcome may span a range of values. For example, a third outcome in the example might be receiving a correct phone book entry; the outcome's cost could show a net benefit to the user, as the number might be used successfully later. However, if the number had become out of date by the time it was used, that would be a net loss. To reflect this uncertainty, 2 The induced function is
which is equivalent to the given one.
the distribution of costs may be represented as a cost-PDF. Figure 1 illustrates a user contemplating a parameterized interaction with principal p. For each possible outcome, the user has a parameterized cost-PDF (a family of cost-PDFs) which represents the range of possible costs and benefits the user might incur, should each outcome occur.
While the risk evaluator is assessing the possible cost-PDFs, the trust calculator provides information t which determines the likelihood of the risk, based on the principal's identity p and the other parameters of the action. This trust information is then used to select the appropriate cost-PDF.
The cost-PDFs of all the outcomes are finally combined by the request analyser, to decide whether to allow the action to be taken, or to arrange further interaction. Since any uncertainty is preserved right up to the decision point, this allows more complex decision making than simple thresholding -allowing responses such as "not sure" if there is not enough information.
In our continuing example, if Liz's PDA received a phone number from Vinny's PDA, she might consider it very unlikely to be maliciously misleading, based on her trust in Vinny's honesty. She might however think it could be out of date, if Vinny had given her stale information before, attributing a higher risk to this outcome. Finally, she would consider the potential benefit of having a correct number, again moderated by Vinny's trustworthiness. Liz's PDA would perform all these calculations on her behalf using its model of her trust beliefs, as illustrated in Figure 2 . If the benefits outweighed the cost of the other outcomes, the PDA would then choose to accept the information. analysis, because she did not know him. At this point, the request analyser might seek out more information, e.g. by discovering that Jon works with Jean, who is trusted by Liz, or by interrupting Liz for confirmation [13] . This explicit risk analysis therefore balances the evidence that a principal is trustworthy against the risks if they are not. This allows sensible behaviour in the face of uncertainty but prevents abuse, since trust assessments are incrementally updated as more evidence becomes available.
Building trust
Fundamentally, trusting decisions are based on trust information, encompassing evidence from personal observations derived from monitoring previous interactions and on recommendations from partly-trusted third parties. These two main sources of stored trust information allow us to dynamically form an opinion about another entity.
Personal observations of the entity's behaviour, through recording outcomes of interactions, are essential for the subjective evaluation of trustworthiness. Observations of the outcomes of interactions are evaluated against the expected behaviour of the principal, to produce experiences [7] . The range of experience values reflects the effect of the observed outcome relative to the expected outcome, usually in terms of gain or loss. These values are ordered and are classified into two sets, a trust positive and a trust negative one. This evidence is aggregated with the evidence from previous interactions to give a comprehensive summary of the interaction history related to a specific entity.
Recommendations from trustworthy third parties enable the propagation of trust in unknown entities, to provide supporting evidence for decisions. The process of recommendation becomes more important when the trust evaluation based on observations is not precise enough. In such cases, further information may be needed. Similarly, imprecise recommendations could be discarded as they provide little additional information. The decision on this issue, however, is left to the individual entity.
Upon receiving a collaboration request, we can dynamically filter the available trust evidence to retain only that relevant to the re-quested action. If no evidence is available for an entity from experience or recommendation we must establish an initial trust value to encourage low risk collaborations. This initial trust value can be determined using a number of strategies, outlined in [4] . This collaboration will provide further evidence upon which to base future trust formation. If there is enough evidence to reason about the entity's trustworthiness, then observation and recommendation will be evaluated to yield trust information. This trust information may be multidimensional, in that separate trust intervals (see Section 2.1) may be formed for different aspects of trust in the interaction. Recommendation evidence is treated separately from evidence based on personal experience as the latter has a greater influence on trust.
The trust model outlined earlier operates using local trust policies. These local policies allow the use of collected evidence, and dictate the conditions under which this opinion of trust formed from evidence should be used. The policies also allow conditional delegation of trust evaluation to an outside entity, an important feature of the trust model. The difference between recommendation and delegation is that we delegate to similar entities to ourselves, which we may consider to be expert for the purpose of the decision; however, in recommendation we gather trust information from any principal in the environment, and more than one recommendation may be sought. Recommendations may also be weighted according to our trust in the source as a recommender.
Software framework
Even if we understand how to reason about trust formation and evolution, as well as how to exploit trust in making access control decisions, we need also to ensure that the algorithms required for these processes can be feasibly implemented in heterogeneous systems. In this regard, we are developing a framework encompassing algorithms for trust management. Figure 3 illustrates the current version of our framework design.
When a request for interaction is made by a principal, p, it passes through the API into the request analyser. The request analyser requests information about p from three sources, the entity recognition component, the trust calculator, and the risk evaluator.
Verification that p is recognized is requested from the entity recognition component (see sidebar), which is responsible for recognizing new or previously encountered entities. The entity recognition component may be consulted by any of the other components to provide recognition capabilities as necessary.
Additionally, the request analyser requests a trust calculation from the trust calculator. The trust calculator computes the least fixed point, as discussed above, using information gathered from the trust lifecycle management component and its local trust policy. As discussed above, the process of calculating a trust level for p may be delegated to another entity, thereby initiating synchronous communication with a remote entity.
The trust calculator 's local policy is updated based on information fed from the trust lifecycle management component. This component handles the formation, evolution, and exploitation of trust based on data drawn from the evidence store. The policy for trust lifecycle management allows the weighting of trust information according to context-specific criteria.
The evidence store is where all trust-and riskrelated data are stored. The evidence store is updated with data collected from evidence gathering, such as recommendations and security updates collected in an asynchronous process, and from the monitoring component. The evidence store is also responding to request for recommendations from other entities.
The monitoring component observes actual interaction with p, as well as conveying the results of such interaction to the evidence store.
The request analyser also requests a risk assessment from the risk evaluator. The risk evaluator calculates the potential risk of the request, based on the local information stored in the risk configuration component, which is updated with information from the evidence store.
All of the information obtained about p is assessed and aggregated. The trust calculation and risk assessment are returned to the request analyser. The request analyser is then able to provide a decision to p regarding possible interaction.
Entity recognition
Note to the editor: This section could be included as a sidebar to the article. It has been observed that authentication in pervasive computing systems is not necessarily enough to ensure security, because identity conveys no a priori information about the likely behaviour of the other entity [2? ]. Entity recognition (ER) [12] has been proposed as a more general replacement for authentication, which does not bind an identity to the recognised entity, i.e. authentication is a special case of recognition that binds an externally visible identity to the recognised entity. We conjecture that the ability to reliably recognise another entity is sufficient to establish trust in that entity based on past experiences and entity recognition provides a local reference to this basis for trust, which is in turn maintained by other components in the SECURE framework.
The SECURE framework includes an entity recognition component based on Pluggable Recognition Modules (PRM), which allows the integration of more or less secure recognition schemes, e.g. traditional authentication modules developed for PAM [10] or pure recognition based schemes, such as APER [12] , which uses signed claims broadcast periodically on a network to recognise entities. The accuracy of a particular recognition scheme must be assessed and a level of confidence associated with the outcome of the recognition process, e.g. the average attack space [14] of recognition schemes could give an upper bound for the confidence in a particular recognition scheme. APER provides three levels of confidence depending on how much verification is applied to the claims, i.e. signature validation and/or claim freshness and/or challenge/response.
Applications
Note to the editor: One of the applications could be omitted to save space.
Given the exploratory nature of the project, it is important to evaluate the proposed mechanisms in the context of real applications. This section overviews three applications that are being worked on by the consortium. Each application deals with a large number of interacting entities, entities that interact may be strangers, and one cannot rely on the presence of a centralized service for security. Despite the heterogeneity of these applications, we are currently developing instantiations of the framework pre-sented earlier that will be used to support each of these applications.
Ad hoc routing
An ad hoc network has no fixed infrastructure, and the lack of implicitly trusted routers means that each node becomes part of the routing fabric. Routing in such a network relies on nodes correctly forwarding packets, yet in general, the intermediate nodes may have no prior contact with the sender. The undetected presence of nodes which are selfish, malicious or even unreliable can seriously impede the routing abilities of other nodes.
The trust model allows the routing protocol to identify and avoid untrustworthy nodes and links. Here, we mean untrustworthy in their ability to forward (and carry, in the case of links) packets, hence this includes both malicious and simply faulty or unreliable principals.
Being able to reason about the trustworthiness of routes has many interesting applications. We are applying our model as an extension to the dynamic source routing (DSR) protocol, in a prototype open urban ad hoc network, currently being deployed in Dublin. The network contains fixed nodes (on street lamps) and mobile nodes (for example, PDAs) which provide additional but transient routing infrastructure. These public mobile nodes can move out of range, lose power or even be malicious or selfish, and using our trust model, these will be assigned low trust values and hence will be avoided by other nodes wishing to route packets in the system. Routes need to be chosen nondeterministically (in proportion to their trustworthiness) to avoid overloading the static nodes which form the backbone of the infrastructure, so providing a form of trust-based load balancing.
Nodes can only observe aggregate properties of routes (not of individual nodes), yet we would like to be able to reason about the trustworthiness of previously unseen routes, so each node performs a two stage local computation:
1. Observe. A node makes a series of observations on a route. Each observation is the result of a packet transmission, representing either success or failure (indicated by a route error packet);
2. Infer. Using the route observation and the current trustworthiness of nodes, a node attempts to infer the most likely new trust values of nodes. This is done by estimating the actual packet-level behaviour of nodes which minimizes the mean-squared error, given the current knowledge.
Nodes can increase their knowledge of the network by the use of recommendations. A node makes a recommendation by piggybacking some of its observations about routes onto the "route discovery" packets sent in the network. The receiving node could simply handle these observations as if they were its own, but for a small caveat: what if the node making the recommendation had lied, in an attempt to subvert the network?
In handling false recommendations we make a simplifying assumption: nodes are rational in that they make true recommendations if they forward packets (and are trustworthy), but may make false recommendations if they do not (in an attempt to justify their misbehaviour). Hence the trustworthiness of a node is an appropriate factor with which to discount its recommendations. The result is that, rather than blindly exchanging routing table entries, nodes can discount these recommendations, taking into account the trustworthiness of other nodes and, recursively, their discounted recommendations. This allows trustworthy nodes to propagate information about untrustworthy nodes, whilst preventing untrustworthy nodes from slandering trustworthy nodes.
Nodes in a wireless network often have limited battery power, so energy conservation is an important topic when considering routing decisions. In a sense, the risk to a node of sending a packet along a particular route is proportional to the energy needed to make the first hop, and the probability of that energy being wasted (if the packet is not successfully sent). Since our trust values represent a meaningful quantity, i.e. the probability of a successful transmission, then the inverse represents the expected number of retransmissions, assuming retries are to the same node (although more complex schemes can be handled). We can therefore say that trust mediates the energy risks in wireless routing.
In summary, the SECURE approach gives nodes in an ad hoc network the ability to reason explicitly about their routing decisions, using trust to mediate the risks involved. More details can be found in [15] .
Collaborative gaming
There is increasing demand for applications like collaborative gaming, where players in different locations can participate in the same gaming session using portable devices. This leads to a need for security measures, as unknown and potentially untrustworthy players may enter gaming sessions. For example, blackjack is a popular card game in which players gamble with a dealer over the value of a set of cards. In our prototype implementation, people play blackjack over a mobile ad hoc network, using laptop computers or PDAs.
For example, suppose Alice takes the 8am commuter train into the city to work every weekday morning. To pass the time, she wishes to play an interactive game, and she joins an ad hoc wireless network to see what collaborative gaming applications are available. She discovers an ongoing blackjack session in which Bob is the dealer, and she requests admission to the game. Bob must decide whether or not to admit Alice to the game, i.e. he must decide whether or not he recognizes Alice, how much he trusts her as a gaming opponent, and how much risk is associated in playing blackjack with her.
The process of entity recognition determines whether or not Bob has interacted with Alice before, as well as the level of confidence in the recognition of Alice. If this is the first time Bob has interacted with Alice, he may need to rely on recommendations from other trusted parties to provide information about Alice. Recommendations may be exchanged verbally, by e-mail, by distributed post-its, etc., and then recorded as evidence.
Based on evidence from his own observations, and/or from recommendations about Alice, Bob can determine a trust level for Alice. Bob needs to trust that Alice will not cheat, spoof, or collude while he is gaming with her. This is the same trust that is required in the casino version of blackjack. Additionally, because in blackjack the dealer's odds of winning are more favorable than the players', the entity holding the dealer role must be considered trustworthy by the other players. Looking at this from another angle, the right to assume the advantageous dealer role can be seen as a privilege earned through fair, trustworthy playing of the game. Should Alice want to enter a game as a dealer, she will need to prove some level of trustworthiness.
Information, such as what sort of playing strategy Alice typically uses, whether she has a high win rate, or whether she pays off her gambling debts, provides evidence for determining Alice's trustworthiness. This information may also help determine the risk of interacting with Alice. For example, information regarding what players are typically playing in games in which Alice is playing may lead to Bob being able to reason about the probability that Alice will collude with other players. This information can be monitored throughout the course of interaction, whereby the results of playing blackjack with Alice are evaluated and stored, or gathered from other sources, such as in the recommendation example above. Bob may also need to respond to requests for recommendations from other players with relevant evidence he has stored.
Bob may wish to delegate his trusting decision altogether. In this case, he must engage in recognition of remote entities with whom he may interact for the purpose of delegation.
Based on the aggregation of all of this information, Bob is able to assess whether he recognizes Alice, to what extent he is certain of his recognition of Alice, how much he trusts Alice, and whether or not that trust level is enough to interact with Alice given the overall risk inherent in the interaction.
Initial results of tests with the prototype implementation [6] show that it reacts correctly to changes in an entity's interactive behaviour, i.e. adjusts trust levels and implements trust-based interaction accurately as trust rises and falls.
Electronic commerce
Electronic purses, or e-purses, are used to permit people to exchange small sums of money. They avoid the need for carrying physical notes and coins by representing money in electronic form. The e-purse uses a smart-card to prevent user tampering. Payment involves the exchange of data between devices and usually involves a specialized terminal reader device. Payments are often termed micro-payments since the sums of money involved are generally small.
Work has now started to use the mobile telephone as an e-purse, with the smart-card storing the sum of money and the functions for debiting and crediting the sum. Payment between devices is done using SMS (Short Message Service). The phone's purse can be loaded by SMS or by a client-server dialog with the bank over a GSM connection. Another possibility for person-to-person payment is to use Bluetooth. Many telephones now possess Bluetooth and this can be used for exchanging sums between telephone purses. The advantage of the Bluetooth solution over the SMS approach is that Bluetooth is an operator-less network, and so data exchange costs nothing.
The example we consider here consists of a user wishing to pay for a bus ticket using his epurse. The user enters the bus and initiates the procedure of purchasing a bus ticket by sending a message to the bus's purse (payment machine). The machine replies and asks for the payment. The e-purse is then activated and the smart-card removes the bus ticket amount from the e-purse.
E-money and exchanges of e-money among the users and the bank are currently being implemented according to the e-cash algorithm [11] . This algorithm defines a format for the e-money, and a cryptographic protocol for e-money exchanges. Roughly, a client wishing to download some e-money into his e-purse contacts his bank and receives a certified e-money ticket that he can use for paying a vendor. The vendor is able to verify the integrity of the enote, but is unable to determine the identity of the client. At a later stage, the vendor submits the e-note to the bank, which checks that the e-note is not a fake, and credits the vendor's account.
The e-cash algorithm is a means for certifying the money stored on a device. It alone is not a guarantee of security, due to the risk of an e-purse being tampered with by its owner. In addition, trust is required in cases where the vendor is unable to verify the money immediately. The security framework defined by SE-CURE consists of several modules present in each principal's e-purse.
First, the collaboration module of the bus receives a collaboration request from the user (see Figure 3) . The bus identifies the client through the Entity Recognition Scheme. It then begins reasoning about the client using the stored evidence. In the case where there is already some information about the client, the bus enters into trust calculation and risk assessment. If there is no information yet about the client, the bus looks for a recommendation. Several choices are available for the bus once it has obtained the result of the trust calculation or the recommendation:
• if there is no trust, it will ask the client for e-money; or even for true money,
• if there is high trust, it can even give credit, recording this for future collection.
• The interaction is then monitored and evaluated, and new evidence stored.
The risk calculation in the e-purse example consists of determining for each action the possible outcomes, and their associated cost. For instance, from the point of view of the bus company, when a user wants to board a bus, it must make a decision based on whether the user has sufficient money to cover the cost of the journey, or whether the e-money may turn out to be forged.
Conclusions
The SECURE project is investigating the design of security mechanisms for pervasive computing based on the human notion of trust. The application of human trust to security leads naturally to a decentralised approach to security management that can tolerate partial information and uncertainty. The central contribution of SECURE is to provide entities with a basis for reasoning about trust and risk embodied in a computational framework that can be adapted to a variety of application scenarios. Underlying this framework is a formal computational model of trust that provides the formal basis for reasoning about trust and for the deployment of verifiable security policies.
Currently, we are continuing to refine the design of the framework and, in particular, our approach to trust formation and evolution to address issues such as collusion and framing. We are also examining the application of trust to role-based access control.
